On vicarious causation

There has been an interesting discussion on relations and OOO unfolding over at Kris Coffield’s blog (here). I thought I would engage primarily with Kris’ post (fascinating in its own right!) but found myself joining the fray in the comments with a particular focus on vicarious causation (toward which I am positively inclined). In response to my comment, Hilary Thayer responded. In this post I develop my response to her response (mainly because I really felt I needed to work through some of these ideas for my own clarity and understanding – so thanks Hilary for posing the questions!).

Hilary said:

I think you’re misunderstanding Harman’s idea of ‘black noise’.

 Here’s how Harman describes black noise:

“Any noise exceeding the object of our attention is structured to as great a degree as the object itself. It is not a white noise of screeching chaotic qualities demanding to be shaped by the human mind, but rather a black noise of muffled objects hovering at the fringes of our attention.” (p.183 Guerrilla Metaphysics)

 Then:

“Accidents [as a particular kind of black noise] are an exception, belonging simultaneously both to the inner and outer sphere of a thing. Here, an important insight begins to take shape, for this very ambiguity is also the central theme of vicarious causation-that one thing touches another, but only indirectly, just as an accident belongs to a thing but only indirectly. And in fact, the form of black noise known as “accidents” will turn out to be precisely where vicarious causation unfolds.” (p.186 ibid)

If (1) we understand accidents as, in part, the influence of peripheral objects modulating the sensual objects we perceive, and (2) we accept causality as being based on allure (i.e. causality is aesthetic an asymmetric), then clearly those other objects that generate the accidents (i.e. black noise) also have a role to play in the process of vicarious causation.

The remaining points follow on from this very closely. Hilary asks:

If real objects must be able to exist apart from one another, how can the ‘third’ object of vicarious causation be called a real object, since it can’t be said to exist apart from the relation?

 Regarding causation on the interior of a ‘larger object’, Harman writes:

“If two objects can interact at all, they must both already be suspended in the same ether, linked by the vicarious cause of a larger object that they themselves both use as a base or alibi for their relationship. Simply put, causation requires a prior shared medium, since otherwise it would be impossible.” (p.189 ibid)

 This shared medium is the object of which the other objects are parts and is very real.

In response to Hilary, then, my main concern is that her question implies that we can no longer talk about objects as having parts because, in order to have parts, objects must be dependent on those parts – i.e. on other objects. This, it would, seem undermines their autonomy or independence. I don’t see it quite this way. Parts retain their autonomy just as the ‘larger object’ does. The larger object is not reducible to its parts though it is certain that, were these to be blown apart, the larger object would cease to exist (except perhaps as traces). On the other hand, the larger object, qua object, has its own autonomy, albeit contingent on the existence of its parts, but not reducible to them. The object is not just ‘a bundle of parts’ but is an autonomous object in its own right. The object treats its parts as ‘elements’. It ‘syphons’ notes from its parts and fuses them together to compose itself without exhausting its parts.

From the point of view of the parts, then, the larger object has effectively become a form of black noise. It is also what permits interaction between the parts to occur. It serves as their ‘alibi’, or the common ‘ether’ or ‘medium’ that provides a basis for their sensual encounter. In this regard (i.e. as far as this particular relationship they share is concerned), the parts (objects in their own right) are on the interior of a third object (they may be in on the interior of multiple object simultaneously). The parts are not, however, wholly on the interior of a third object: they are only partially parts. Thus, for example, a living cell could be extracted from an organism (ouch!) and would continue to be a living cell provided it was supplied with what it needed to live. It doesn’t stop being a living cell simply because it is separated from the object of which it was formerly a part. This illustrates the autonomy of the part from the larger object it composes.

Hilary then continues:

to say that relations always exist as parts of a larger whole overmines objects, in my view, as it would seem to infer that objects exists only insofar as their relations to the larger object, in contrast to what you suggest.

It is not so much that relations always exist as parts of larger wholes but rather that unless two parts are both on the interior of a third object, these parts cannot enter into a relationship with each other. The relationship itself is a unique object and it is unified, withdrawn and autonomous, and therefore not reducible to the object of which it is a part.

If an object’s basis for relationship only existed as part of its “joint status” within another object, then the object’s powers or potential would be determined, in some sense, by the larger scale object, reducing the object’s capacities, qualities, and essence to a relation to another entity, one “greater” than itself.

I think I disagree with this. The basis for relationship is not only due to its joint status within another object. Rather, the particular capacities (or powers) that the given object has to enter into relationships with other objects serves as the basis for its entering into relationships. Of course, the nature of the third object ‘within which’ (and it’s always a partial within-ness) the relating parts find themselves will influence which capacities are likely to be actualised and in which ways (just as climatic or soil conditions may affect the germination of seeds). This is very different from saying that, in some sense, the object’s “capacities, qualities, and essence” were being reduced “to a relation to another entity”. Rather, their expression is contingent.

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